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The question arises in the analysis of foreign policy
decision making regarding how consensus or approval by the public
is attained for policies.

Some authors have suggested that con-

sensus is obtained through the manipulation of opinion by decision
makers.

One case often cited as an example of manipulation is the

1947 announcement of the Truman Doctrine .
In determining the validity of these arguments a review was
conducted of the language of the doctrine and the interpretations
of newspaper columnists.

In addition, a review of personal docu-

ments of the decision makers was conducted to determine their

2

impressions.
The data compiled from these sources indicate that the
authors who claim manipulation might have exaggerated the case.
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INTRODUCTION
The decision by the Truman Administration in February
and March of 1947 to provide aid and assistance to Greece
and Turkey has been heralded as a landmark event in American
foreign policy.

The announcement of the Truman Doctrine

has been labeled as "an incomparable assumption of
responsibility, in the United States' own right, of a kind
never assumed before."l

Essentially, the responsibilities

that the United States assumed were those of a principle
actor in a balance of power, a role which has remained
constant for the United States until today. 2
While many of the historical works on the subject of
the Truman Doctrine have lauded the "cooperative effort"3
between the various government departments, the press,
Congress and the public, as an example of a consensus in
foreign policy, the Truman Doctrine and its so-called
consensus are not without controversy.

One body of

literature has suggested that the consensus among the press
and the public was created or "manipulated"4, and that the
primary instrument of this political control or manipulation
was "domestic propaganda 115 disseminated among the press
and the public by policy making elites.
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If one is to either prove or disprove the contentions
of those who argue the "manipulation thesis"6, one needs

to analyze a number of factors pertinent to the discussion.
To begin with, both the terms manipulation and propaganda
are used in the works of these manipulation theorists: it is
important to understand their meanings.

Webster's Third

International Dictionary defines manipulation as:
"management of the use of unfair, scheming or underhanded
methods especially for one's own advantage."

Webster

further defines propaganda as:
doctrines, ideas, arguments, facts or allegations
spread by deliberate effort through any medium of
communication in order to further one's cause or to
damage an opposing cause.
Th~

implication is that manipulation of opinion through the

use of propaganda to gain support for foreign policies is
deceptive and therefore wrong.

While this notion might

certainly be a sufficient question for a thesis in itself,
it is merely a point of departure in this case.

This paper

will instead focus on one event in American foreign policy
and evaluate the criticisms of the body of theorists who
advocate the manipulation theory.

If these manipulation

theorists are in fact correct, one might expect to find
evidence to suggest that administration policy making elites
used
unfair, scheming and underhanded ••• doctrines,
ideas, arguments, facts and allegations spread by
deliberate effort through any medium of communication
in order to further [their] own cause or damage an
opposing cause.
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The analysis, therefore, will center on discussions of the
language used in the public presentations, theories of

language and communication in politics, and perceptions of
the central actors in the decision making process to
determine the extent to which this language could be labeled
propaganda.
This analysis will begin with a review of the
historical interpretations of the formulations and
implementations of the policies proposed by the Truman
Doctrine.
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FOOTNOTES
1 Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York:
Viking Press, 1955) p. 161.

The

2Louis Rene Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: U.S.
Foreign Policy and World Order (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath
and Company, 1984> pp. 1-2.
3Jones, The Fifteen Weeks pp. vii, 12, 150.
4Micheal Leigh, Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion
and American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947 (Westport: Greenwood
Press, 1976) p. 141; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of
Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy,
1945-1954 {New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972)
p. 333.
5Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the
Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Relations
and Internal Security, 1946-1948 {New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1972) p. 88.
6Leigh, Mobilizing Consent p. 160. Among those
authors considered to be "manipulation theorists" are
Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United
States in the Third World (New York: World Publishing Co.,
1968); Doris A. Graber, Public Opinion,· The President, and
Foreign Policy: Four Case Studies from the Formative Years
{New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968); David
Horowitz, Free World Colossus {New York: Hill and Wang,
Inc., 1965); Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power:
The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972).
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HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
Much of 1946 had been taken up in Washington with
negative reactions to Soviet policies.

The Soviets

reportedly were applying "direct pressure" 1 to Iran and
Turkey.

In addition, the Soviets were making hostile

speeches and encroaching on other countries including Greece
and the nations of Eastern Europe.2

These events led to a

recognition on the part of the State Department and the
Truman Administration that a new approach would have to be
taken in dealing with the Soviet Union.
The focus of the new approach which the Administration
chose to take was outlined in a long dispatch from Moscow by
Soviet expert and State Department official George Kennan.
Kennan's report viewed Soviet intransigence in terms of the
Soviet perception of an innate antagonism with the Western
World, and that this antagonism would continue until the
Soviet Union had destroyed the capitalist nations.

It is

from this antagonism and its underlying ideology which
Kennan suggested that Soviet foreign policy be viewed.
Kennan argued that this underlying ideology would cause the
Soviets to continue their policies of expansion.

They would

be constantly attempting to gain new areas of control
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through violence and subversion.

The response by the United

States, according to Kennan should be one of attempting to
contain the Soviets in those spheres of influence they have
already attained.
Kennan believed that the most rational method for
achieving this "containment" was to grant aid to those
countries which had suffered because of the war.

Assumedly

these were the areas which were most vulnerable to any type
of Soviet incursions.

The Kennan report argued that

Soviet expansion had to be countered by promoting the
"security" of those countries not under Soviet
domination.3
In addition to the Kennan report, the attitude of the
Truman Administration towards the Soviet Union was somewhat
influenced by the British attitude towards the Soviets.
This British attitude was expressed by Prime Minister
Winston Churchill in a speech at Fulton, Missouri in which
he called for, "an alliance of English speaking peoples" and
an avoidance of appeasement.4

Thus, the role of being a

principal actor in the international balance of power was
thrust upon the United States.

Under the leadership of

Secretary of State James Byrnes, the U.S. announced its
policy of "firmness and patience," in which the American
position would be a firm stance to induce the Soviets to
"play the game in the American way."5

7

Because of a hostile Congress and a public whose
opinions on the issue ranged from apathy to isolationism,6

however, the Truman Administration was not fully able to
apply the type of pressure it would have liked; the
costs and commitments of such pressure would not have
been tolerated in the American Post WWII climate of
isolationism.7

To pursue the policy of containment

suggested by Kennan something needed to change.

This

change came in February of 1947.
On February 21, 1947 the British Ambassador in
Washington, Lord Inverchappel, delivered two notes to
American officials in the State Department; one note
concerned Greece and the other concerned Turkey.

The notes

essentially stated that Great Britain, strained by the costs
of the war, would no longer be able to meet its commitments
in these two countries.

Britain had been supporting the

Greek government with assistance for the civil war that they
had been engaged in with rebels who were presumed to be
sponsored by the Soviets.

The British had also been

assisting Turkey which was faced with an increase of Soviet
troops along its border with the

u.s.s.R.

Spanier points

out, "the import of the British notes was clear:

that a

Soviet breakthrough could be prevented only by an all out
American commitment." 8

This, of course, meant that

funds would have to be obtained by making a request to
Congress.
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While this American commitment was apparently
necessary, the problem of an apathetic public and a hostile
Congress still existed.

In the week immediately following

the presentation of the British notes a group of leading
Senators and Representatives met in the White House to hear
then Secretary of State Marshall's summary of the situation.
Present at the meeting were some of the most influential
members of Congress, including members of the Senate
Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees, and members
of the House Appropriations and Foreign Affairs Committees.
The President wanted to get the reaction of these individuals
to the problem, as their influence and approval would be
vital if aid were to be administered in Greece and Turkey.
Secretary Marshall began the presentation to the
Congressmen, but as Jones argues, his rather "dry and
economical terms" and "cryptic presentation" of the problem
did not serve the desired purpose of convincing the
Congressmen as to the urgency of the aid to Greece and
Turkey.

In fact, it seems that Marshall's presentation had

left the "overall impression that aid should be extended to
Greece on grounds of loyalty and humanitarianism and to
Turkey to strengthen Britain's position in the Middle
East. 119

At this point Mr. Acheson was given the floor and

proceeded to describe the situation in somewhat different
terms.

Acheson rhetorically painted a picture of an

aggressive Soviet Union "encroaching" on Turkey, Germany
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and other "democratic" states while continuing to apply
"pressure" on Greece, inching toward the ultimate goal of
"domination" of the Middle East and "penetration" into South
Asia and Africa.10
This emotional language served the purpose.

Regarding

the Acheson presentation, Jones notes,
When he finished a profound silence ensued that
lasted perhaps ten seconds. It was broken by the voice
of Senator Vandenburg. Slowly and with gravity,
Vandenburg said that he had been greatly impressed, even
shaken by what he had heard ••• He felt that it was
absolutely necessary that any request of Congress for
funds and authority to aid Greece and Turkey be
accompanied by a message to Congress, and an explanation
to the American people, in which the grim facts of the
larger situation should be laid publicly on thI line as
they had been at their meeting there that day. 1
Since Vandenburg had traditionally been one of the leading
advocates of the isolationist attitude it was clear that
Acheson's presentation had a profound effect.

Seeing how

effective this type of presentation could be in overcoming
the isolationist and apathetic mood, President Truman
appointed Undersecretary Acheson to head the staff which was
to draft his speech.
With Acheson having been assigned to the State, War,
Navy coordinating Committee which was to form the
information program from which the Truman speech was to be
drafted, it was expected that the presentation to the public
would be full of the same emotional rhetoric which was used
by Acheson in his presentation to the Congressional leaders.
The result of the S.W.N.C.C. 's work was a paper titled,
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Public Information Program on United States Aid to Greece,
and it was from this document that the rhetoric was
virtually lifted word for word and incorporated
in the first draft of the President's message ••••• It
survived all subsequent revisions almost intact most of
the few alterations being additions by Acheson. 1 2
Primarily because of Acheson's treatment of the
presentation and Vandenburg's later suggestion regarding the
need for public disclosure,
The State Department Public Information officers
recommended a program to portray the word conflict
between free and totalitarian or imposed forms of
government in order to make the American peopt~
recognize the importance of the Greek crisis.
An understanding of the role of the Public Information
officers in the drafting of the S.W.N.C.C. document and the
speech by President Truman is important for this paper, and
is well discussed by Jones.

He notes that, in a rare show

of cooperation,
The policy-operations officers were among the most
effective in making suggestions in the tone and content
of the public approach, and the information officers
were equally effective in analyzing strategic and
political considerations •••• The information officers
with their sensibilities attuned to the publiI made a
powerful contribution to the Truman Doctrine. 4
The draft of the Truman speech by the S.W.N.C.C.
underwent some further minor revisions by Clark Clifford,
who at the time was Special Counsel to the President.

Many

of the changes which Clifford proposed dealt with the tone
of the message.

Clifford, as did Acheson, saw the value in

a "dramatic"lS presentation of the situation to the
American people.

He argued that the speech should contain

------:
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language which could serve to present the situation to the
public in the "strongest possible" terms.

Jones cites some

examples of Clifford's inclusions,
This is a serious course upon which we embark.
I would not recommend it except that the alternative is
more serious •••• The seeds of totalitarian regimes are
nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in
the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their
full growig when the hope of a people for a better life
has died.
It is argued that this type of language, with its
emotional content was included in the draft of President
Truman's speech to persuade those individuals who might not
be persuaded by a precise rational presentation of the
facts.

This type of presentation had failed once before,

when Secretary Marshall attempted to explain the situation
to the group of Congressional leaders.

Only when

Mr. Acheson presented the problem in more dramatic language
did those present accept and, in fact, understand the need
for aid to Greece and Turkey.

More importantly those who

heard the presentations at the White House were those who
presumably had some interest and attention to foreign
affairs.

If they did not respond to the factual

presentation of the problem, it was very unlikely that an
apathetic public would respond to such a presentation
either.

Hence, the Truman Doctrine was couched in broad

policy terms and intended to "scare the hell out of"1 7
the American people.

12
The setting for the Truman speech on March 12th, 1947
was extremely dramatic.

Jones notes that the House floor and

its galleries were jammed.
Every clerk, secretary, or functionary on
Capitol Hill whose familiar face would gi~ him
past a guard at a door was on the floor.
At 12:45 p.m. the President pro tempore of the Senate,
Senator Vandenburg, and other members of the Senate entered
and Vandenburg mounted the rostrum.

At 12:57 p.m. the

members of the President's Cabinet entered the room, at 1:00
p.m. the Speaker of the House announced the President, who
was escorted in by three Senators and three Representatives.
Truman entered to a loud ovation and mounted the rostrum.
The first words he spoke implied the threat and conveyed the
urgency which he desired to express to the world.
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress
of the United States, the gravity of the situation which
confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of Congress. The foreign polifg and
the national security of this country are involved.
Truman went on to discuss his specific proposals for
supplying economic and military assistance to Greece and
Turkey.

Interestingly, and perhaps for purposeful reasons,

every time the President mentioned Greece it was proceeded or
followed by the adjective •democratic• in some form or
another.
Greece must have assistance if it is to become a
self-respecting democracy •••• There is no country to which
democratic Greece can turn •••• No other nation is willing
and able to provi~8 necessary support for a democratic
Greek government.
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Truman also discussed the importance of maintaining the
"national integrity" of Turkey and the importance of that
integrity to the preservation of order in the Middle East.
Using such terms in discussing Greece and Turkey was an
interesting device to suggest a strong need for a United
States commitment.
Beyond the questionable message which Truman was
imparting regarding these specific areas of the world, the
Truman Doctrine in its wider context addressed the notion of
a United States foreign policy that must be,
••• willing to help free peoples to maintain
their free institutions and their national integrity
against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon
them totalitarian regimes.
This is no more than a frank
recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free
peoples, by direct or indirect aggression undermine the
foundations of international peace and hence the
security of the United States •••• I believe it must be
the policy of the United States to support free peoples
who are resisting attempted subjugatf on by armed
minorities or by outside pressures.2
After making these allusions to a threat to the "national
security" of the United States caused by "aggressive
movements" attempting to "subjugate" a "free democratic"
Greek state, the President requested from Congress
approximately $400 million in economic and military
assistance.
Following the speech the President briskly exited from
the House floor.

His speech was met with applause but not

the boisterous response which usually followed a Presidential
address.

Although the impact of the President's address
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was not immediately felt, it was not slow in coming.

Jones

notes regarding the response to the address, "it was
tremendous, somewhat confused, and on the whole
favorable. 1122

Poll data collected in the weeks following

the announcement of the Truman Doctrine tend to confirm the
statements made by Jones.
The survey data used in this paper was collected
following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine by the
American Institute of Public Opinion and the National Opinion
Research Center.

The results were published in issues of the

journal, Public Opinion Quarterly in 1947. 2 3
The first poll concerning the proposals for aid to
Greece and Turkey was taken just two weeks after the March
12th speech, (see index, Table 1).

While this poll does

show a majority in favor of the Truman proposals, it is
clear that no sweeping consensus existed regarding his
proposals.

Two polls taken in later months seem to suggest

that the majority in favor of the Truman proposals was
steadily increasing.

A poll taken by the National Opinion

Research Center in April of 194724 suggests that the
percentage of support for the Truman proposals had increased
from 56 to 67 percent, (see appendix, Table 2).

Upon closer

analysis of this poll one sees that the support is only for
that part of the proposals that calls for economic aid, the
proposals calling for the provision of military assistance
for Greece and Turkey were disapproved overwhelmingly.

A
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third poll taken in June of 1947 suggests that the
majority of those who favored the proposals-presumably

for both economic and military aid-was increasing.
This time from 56 to 66 percent percent, (see appendix,
Table 3).
The historical information and the poll data appear
to indicate, in general, that the policy proposals of the
Truman Doctrine speech were met with a moderate approval
which increased over time.

This suggests that if any

feelings of isolationism or apathy among the public and
Congress existed at the time of the announcement, the
information campaign initiated by the administration
changed these feelings.
The sequence of events noted above indicates that the
formulation of policy preceded any public demand for
action.

This is consistent with the arguments of a number

of authors regarding the way foreign policy is made.2 5
One assumes that foreign policy decision makers establish
goals based on their interpretation and analysis of the
information and then attempt to achieve those goals by the
most rational or effective means.26

If this is the

case, then the Truman administration must have perceived
that containment of the Soviet Union was the goal they
desired to achieve, but having doubts about the public's
and Congress' willingness to accept these proposals, the
administration determined that it would have to initiate an
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information campaign to build consensus and, thereby,
support for the aid proposals.
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FOOTNOTES
lJohn Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World
War II (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980) p. 30.
2william c. Mallalieu, "The Origin of the Marshall
Plan", Political Science Quarterly 73 (December, 1958)
p. 484.
3Ibid.
4 spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II
p. 24.
5Ibid.
6Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The
World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972) p. 334.
7Ibid., 332-336.
8spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II
p. 24.

9Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York:
Viking Press, 1955) p. 139.
lOibid., p. 140.
llibid., p. 142.
12Ibid., pp. 152-153.
13Mallalieu, "The Origin of the Marshall Plan",
p. 484.
14Jones, The Fifteen Weeks p. 150.
15Ibid., p. 155.
16Ibid.
17Mallalieu, "The Origin of the Marshall Plan",
p. 485.
18Jones, The Fifteen Weeks p. 17.
19Ibid., p. 19.

The
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20Ibid., p. 20.
2 1 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
22 Ibid., p. 29.
23Mildred Strunk, ed., "The Quarter's Polls",
Public Opinion Quarterly 11 (1947).
24Micheal Leigh, Mobilizing Consent: Public
Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947 (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1976) p. 143.
25James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign
Policy CNew York: Random House, 1962)~ Bernard c. Cohen,
The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1973). Both authors argue that public
opinion is often by-passed as an initial input in the policy
process.
26Thomas L. Brewer, American Foreign Policv:
Contemporary Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980) p. 30.
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III
MANIPULATION AND SYMBOLISM

The arguably questionable way in which the public
information campaign and the Truman Doctrine were formulated
and presented to the public has led a number of historians
to question whether the attempt to build support for the
Greek-Turkish aid proposals went beyond an informational
campaign.

More than one of those historians has used

the term manipulation in referring to the activities of
those organizing the public information effort. 1

The

evidence usually presented as the basis for such assertions
is the use of emotional and questionable language in the
public comments by officials,2 the numerous, and
arguably dubious, allusions to crisis, 3 and the
difference in reactions that were to be found in the poll
data when the questions were phrased in a more emotional
fashion.4

These arguments imply a massive propaganda

effort on the part of the Truman administration to
"sell"S the Greek-Turkish aid proposals to the American
public.
Much literature has been written on the subject of
how the government uses propaganda and language to sway an
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uninformed and unaware public.

The bulk of this literature

concentrates on the notion of symbolism in politics.

An

understanding of symbolism and its application to the
question of consensus building in American Foreign policy
is best achieved by reviewing some of the arguments
presented by the most prominent authors.
These authors argue that many of the actions which a
state, especially the United States, takes are done for
symbolic purposes; this includes many of the ceremonial
acts, the public declarations and the various functions of
the government.6

These actions are quite often symbolic

in themselves, or they include language or procedures which
could be considered symbolic.
By symbolic, we mean those actions that are taken
intending to elicit a non-rational response from the
audience receiving the signal.

Rather than a reasoned

debate about the true merits of political choices, the
American public is often subjected to words, phrases,
settings and actions which serve to symbolize myths.

These

myths, having been ingrained in our consciousness since
childhood by folklore, fables, songs, religion, family and
entertainment media serve to arouse emotional rather than
reasoned thought processes.

These emotional thought

processes both obscure our rational abilities and dictate
our responses to what have been suggested to us as being
political issues.

W. Lance Bennett differentiates between
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"primary process thinking" and "secondary process
thinking"?; the latter being a rational thought process
and the former being,
projection, fantasy, the incorporation of
nonverbal imagery, a high emotional content, the easy
connection of disparate ideas, the failure to make
underlying assumptions expl~cit, and the generation of
multiple levels of meaning.
Many types of actions, both verbal and nonverbal, can
be considered symbolic.

This study will focus primarily on

myths, rituals, settings, institutions, threats and
assurances.

Certainly, the symbolic ability of these

instruments is suggested merely by a casual knowledge of
each.

But a more thorough, specific definition is in order

to understand to what extent these are symbolic.
To understand the methods by which governments elicit
emotional responses from the public about political issues
one needs to view the political belief system of the
American public.

To do this the literature on the uses of

myth in American politics and society is important.
Myths are the primary method by which individuals in
the government engage in communication with the public.
Myths are the basic truths about any society.

More

precisely, they are those things that a society believes to
be its basic truths.

They are those things to which members

of the society feel they should aspire; those things,
although often ambiguous and highly emotional, which a
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society can believe in.

Myths are promulgated by all media,

and as noted previously, are ingrained in the public
consciousness.

When presented to the public they produce an

emotional response.

Bennett notes,

Cultural processes produce common social
understandings and guide people in using these
understandings to organize life situations, to
respond to new social conditions, and to accept
their positions in the social order.9
In essence, myths define societal values and ideologies, and
thus contribute to a belief system for individuals who have
been subjected to the same cultural processes.
Both Bennett and Murray Edelman note that some of the
most pervasive myths in American society are those of
liberty, freedom, democracy and citizen participation. 1 0
If one looks closely at these terms, and perhaps attempts to
define them, one sees the ambiguity that is inherent in each
term.

This ambiguity aids in dissuading the audience from

trying to employ a reasoned thought process about the
message they are receiving.

To do so would require that

they define the terms, and this would prove quite taxing if
not impossible.

Few Americans have the time or inclination

to have read much political theory.

It is reasonable to

assume that most are unfamiliar with the works of Mill,
Locke, Rousseau or any of those who have spent time
discussing these issues.

In addition to, or perhaps in

spite of, their ambiguity, the use of the aforementioned
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terms can inspire within most of us a whole host of
patriotic and nationalistic sentiments.

Growing up in

America, and being exposed to the various cultural and
political influences which permeate our society is testimony
to the ease with which these influences could be coordinated
for effective political control.

Knowing this, it is little

wonder that arguments have been made regarding the
manipulation of opinion in America.
Many of the arguments regarding the use of myth in
political communication in America are bolstered by the
notion of ritual behavior that governments engage in to
promulgate and reinforce the public's belief in its myths.
Bennett defines ritual as follows:
A ritual can be defined as a set of routine
procedures used by participants in recurring
situations.
-to establish and display the social principles
(embodied in myth) that the participants agree to
observe in the situation,
-to show how those principles will be applied to
specific issues in the situation, and
-to ~emonfrrate the reasonableness of the
action.,
Many authors, including Bennett and Edelman, maintain
that elections and the act of voting are ritualistic in
that they promulgate the myths of democracy and citizen
participation.12

Edelman notes regarding voting,

"[Voting] is participation in a ritual act, however, only
in a minor degree is it participation in policy
formulation. 0 13

This notion of voting as only a minor

degree of participation in policy formulation is quite
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important to the argument regarding myths, rituals, and the
creation of opinion in American politics.

Because if ritual

acts such as voting are not really as important as we have
been led to believe, then what significance does any opinion
which a public might express have in policy formulation.

In

his work, Edelman cites a number of authors who argue that
elections are necessary as they provide the public with some
forum that essentially makes them believe that they have
actually participated in a rational policy choice.

These

authors cited by Edelman maintain that without some such
device for achieving this goal, the legitimacy of the
government would be lost.14
Certainly elections are not the only ritual which
governments utilize as a method of political control.

The

raising and saluting of the flag, the reciting of a pledge
of allegiance which includes such terms as liberty, freedom
and justice are also ritual.

Some have even mentioned that

the adversarial system of the trial which is engaged in by
the United States court system is itself ritualistic. 15
Arguably then, based on this speculation regarding
ritual in American politics, a case could be made that such
things as the language of Presidential requests to Congress
for items such as economic and military assistance are
merely ritual in content.

Congressmen, having been brought

up in the United States and having been subjected to the
same "cultural processes" are just as likely to engage in
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primary process thinking as most members of the public and
are just as likely to "understand" the situation in a way

which is nonrational but desirable by those employing the
symbols.

Presidential speeches, statements before Congress,

statements made in press conferences and personal appeals
made by a President to a Congressman for support can also be
seen as ritual; both for the symbolic language used in these
communications and because of the reinforcement of the
publicly held mythical beliefs about American government
which these acts provide.

Edelman notes,

Political forms thus come to symbolize what large
masses of men need to believe about the state to
reassure themselves •••• The point is that every political
institution and act evokes and reinforces a particular
response in its audiences •••• In democratic countries
these institutions reinforce beliefs in the reality of
citizen participation in government and in the rational
basis of government decisions, regardless of what is
said in thr course of the proceedings on particular
occasions. 6
Edelman provides us, in his explanation, with other factors
to view in terms of symbolism.

The institutions of

government and the language that is used by these
institutions in their rituals is seen as being symbolic and
initiating primary process thinking by the audience.

Since

the focus of analysis in this paper is a specific event in
American foreign policy, the Truman Doctrine, we should view
the institutions whose role were most important, the
settings which enhanced these institutions and the language
used by them.
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Perhaps the pre-eminent institution regarding foreign
affairs is the office of the President.

In addition to the

broad formal powers which the President possesses regarding
foreign affairs there is also the enormous power a President
possesses in his ability to persuade.

In other words,

Presidents enjoy both posited and symbolic power.

Perhaps

the most prominent work on the subject of the President's
ability to persuade is that by Richard Neustadt.
Neustadt argues that the Presidential power to
persuade has its roots in a number of factors.

Some of

these factors are personal or individual to the person
holding the office at the time.
faculties and his charm.

These include his logical

Other factors affecting a

President's ability to influence the mass and elite public
are those which are inherent in the off ice that the
individual holds.
authority.

These powers include status and

The President himself is a symbol for every

person in the country.

More appropriately, the office of

the President is an institution to which members of both the
mass and elite publics focus their attention, hopes and
fears.
The essence of a President's persuasive task is
to convince such men that what the White House wants of
them is what they ou~ht to do for their own sake and on
their own authority. 7
Perhaps the most interesting and effective device
employed by individuals, especially the President, for
reinforcing myths and creating threats and assurances to
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the public is the political speech.

If we recall that the

public tends to respond to emotional stimuli, we can view
political speeches in this light.

Edelman notes,

Political acts, speeches, and gestures involve
mass audiences emotionally in politics while rendering
them acquiesISnt to policy shifts through that very
involvement.
While it is important to note the emotive content of the
language employed in these speeches, it is equally important
to discuss the emotional impact of the speech itself.

This

is especially true in the case of a Presidential address,
primarily because of the symbolism inherent in the Off ice of
the Presidency and because of the settings that accompany a
Presidential address.
Edelman argues that the settings for political acts
and speeches often employ devices intended to evoke an
emotional response from the audience, thus they serve as
symbols to the audience.

For instance, the formality of a

Presidential "State of the Union" address or a speech before
a joint session of Congress can serve as a symbol of the
official nature of the speech and this formality can set the
tone for the seriousness of the message that the speaker is
delivering.

The sight of the President standing at the

rostrum of the Senate floor, flanked by the Vice-President
and the speaker of the House, with most of the members of
his cabinet and congress in session can "prove" to the
audience the authority of the speaker and the importance of
the message he is imparting.

The remoteness of the speech
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sets it apart from other types of Presidential public
appearances.

He is not campaigning; he is not answering

questions from reporters; he is addressing the country and
indeed the rest of the world.

Thus, the formality of this

type of Presidential speech takes the President out of his
normal role as an administrator and puts him in the new role
of teacher.

The teaching role of the President has been

carefully analyzed by Nicholas Berry who cites three
functions of this role,
1.
2.
3.

To get the attention of those who must act.
To get the acceptance of the goals proposed by
the leader.
To create a commitment to act a certain way.19

Berry further argues,
Teaching sets the stage for concerted action.
It previews what will happen. It mobilizes energy and
inflames the spirit. It guides behavior in the creation
and administration of public policy. It tests the
proba~ili~
of success by creating a public
reaction. 0
What Berry seems to be suggesting is that the Presidential
"teaching" role is intended to create opinion and is indeed,
structured for that purpose.

There appears to be a strong

relationship between Berry's "teaching role of the
President" and Leigh and Kolko's "manipulation."

Edelman

notes,
The appropriateness of act to setting is normally
so carefully plotted in the political realm that we are
rarely conscious of the imp~ftance or the ramifications
of the tie between the two.
Beyond the idea of the use of appropriate
institutional settings in creating symbols, is the use of
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language for symbolic purposes.

Indeed, language is perhaps

the most evocative instrument available for creating threats
and assurances to the public.

Edelman notes,

In subtle and obvious ways cultures shape
vocabulary and meaning, and men respond to verbal
cues •••. Language becomes a sequence of Pavlovian cues
rather than an instrument for reasoning and an~~ysis if
situations and appropriate cue occur together.
Thus, Edelman argues, language is effective as a symbol
because of its ability to connote threats and assurances
that serve as cues for public response.

Certain words and

phrases have distinct meanings to American society,
especially the mass public, and tend to evoke emotional
responses.

Public officials, especially Presidents, having

been brought up in American society and having campaigned in
it are aware of these words or phrases and can employ them
when they desire the public to respond in a specific way.
Thus, a speech intended to direct the public towards a
specific response might employ passionate language.

This is

especially true in a case where the public official
perceives that the public might not be ready to undertake
the commitment necessary to fulfill the policy proposed.
Edelman notes, "language sometimes directly encourages
behavior contrary to peoples interests. 11 23
Presumably the public official knows which audience he
is trying to get a certain response from.

Different

audiences will respond to different styles of speech.
Edelman cites four styles of speech which "pervade the
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governmental process", these are hortatory, legal,
administrative and bargaining.2 4

Since the focus of

this paper is the effect of language and symbols on foreign
policy consensus-building among the public, attention will
be paid to that style of speaking best suited for appealing
to a primarily uninformed and unconcerned mass public, which
tends to respond to emotional stimuli.
Edelman argues that the hortatory language style is
the most effective for soliciting support for policy among
the mass public, and is quite often the style employed when
using symbolic language.

Edelman notes,

The hortatory style consists formally of premises,
inferences and conclusions, some stated and others
implied.
The conclusions, being promises or threats,
amount to appeals for public support, and this
generality of appeal is the style's most conspicuous
formal element •••• In spite of the almost total ambiguity
of the terms employed, each instance of the use of this
language styled is accepted as evidenge of the need for
widespread support of public policy.2
The goal of hortatory speaking style is to stress a rational
approach to a problem by emphasizing the key words.

Edelman

argues, "Audiences value gestures and postures consistent
with rationality. 112 6

But often the ambiguity of the

symbolic language used merely gives the impression of
rationality while really creating an emotional image or
stimulus for the mass public.

Indeed, it is this emotional

stimulus, often a threat to the country that causes the
sense of a need for support.
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It is important at this point to discuss who is
capable of such a grand task as the determination and the
distribution of symbols calculated to effect a response from
the public.

If, as noted previously, cultural processes

dictate the way individuals in the United States perceive
things, how are some individuals in a position to affect a
public's perception of foreign policy issues?

One must look

to the numerous elite leadership theories of American
government for an answer.

Specifically, those relating to

elitism in the foreign policy decision making processes.
Since much of the information presented in this paper
has dealt with nonrational or emotional understanding of
political issues as opposed to rational understandings of
politics, a body of literature which addresses information
and awareness levels among the public immediately suggests
itself for observation.

First addressed by Gabriel

Almond,2 7 then expanded by James Rosenau 28 and
Bernard Cohen, 2 9 this body of literature essentially
argues that if one considers the American public as a
whole, approximately 75-90 percent of the public is
unaware of or inattentive to foreign affairs: of the
remaining 10-25 percent only a fraction of a percent
are aware enough, motivated enough and associated enough
to have a hand in the making of foreign policy.

This

establishes an elite group of individuals to whom the
avenues of public information and policy formulation are
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simultaneously open.

This elite group serves as a focus for

any analysis of alleged "manipulation" of public opinion in
forming consensus or foreign policy issues.

Two authors who

have viewed elite arguments and done research into
backgrounds of elites within the United States found eight
distinctive characteristics of elites, and identified four
members who drafted the Truman Doctrine as elites.30
The basic elite structure of foreign policy decision
making is pyramid shaped.

In other words, those individuals

who comprise the elite groups, with the awareness,
motivation and access to an audience, are at the highest
level of the pyramid and comprise the smallest group.

If

evidence can be found that individuals within this group
engaged in or intended to employ specific language to build
a manipulated consensus on foreign policy issues, then the
works of authors such as Barnett, Kolko, Freeland, Graber
and Leigh can be substantiated.

If no evidence of any

intentional misleading of public perception can be found, it
would be difficult to conclude the accuracy of such claims.
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IV

SYMBOLISM AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
While the evidence that could clearly support claims
that public opinion was manipulated in building consensus
for the Greek-Turkish aid program can be found in the public
and private documents of policy makers, it is important,
primarily, to view the various arguments and circumstantial
evidence which has been put forth as proof of such
manipulation.

Many of those who maintain that such

manipulation could occur rest their arguments on the
dramatic nature of the message delivered by the president on
March 12th 1947 1 •

Indeed, much of the literature on the

notion of symbolism in politics argues that dramatic
presentations of issues by leaders, such as the president
with the symbolic force of his office, are a sure way to
mobilize support.

These arguments hold that certain types

of language and their tone imply and suggest threats to the
public, and that this is an effective means for galvanizing
support.

One way in which a threat can be implied and a

public can be mobilized is by suggesting that a crisis
exists and must be dealt with.

It is argued that this is

precisely what was done in the Truman Doctrine speech.
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It has been argued that the language of the Truman
Doctrine was intended to induce an emotional response from

the public by implying a threat.2

One clear example of

this threat is the numerous references to the Greek
situation as being a "Crisis".3

A significant amount of

research has been conducted regarding the notion of crisis
in international politics.

The potency of the symbol which

the term generates is significant and the use of the term in
this context is important in understanding the symbolic
language of the Truman doctrine.
To begin with, crises are situations in which some
type of unfavorable action is threatened or inflicted. In
addition, crises are mostly unexpected events.
they are a surprise to the leaders.

That is,

Beyond this, crises are

events which call upon a threatened or inflicted population
for concerted action,
More powerfully, perhaps, than any other
political term, it suggests a need for unity and
common sacrifice •••. [Itl justif[ies] the actions of
leaders and the sacrifices leaders demand of
others.4
Thus, the notion of crisis corresponds to the discussion by
Edelman of symbols providing threats and assurances to the
masses.

Crisis sets the tone for any message which is to

follow.

In the case of the Truman Doctrine, the implication

that the situation in Greece was a crisis left all further
discussions, including requests for aid, to be viewed in
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that light.

The threat of the situation in Greece was

established before Truman said a word about it.
The question arises at this point is whether the
specific situation in Greece in 1946-47 could truly be
categorized as a crisis.

As noted earlier, a good deal of

research has been conducted concerning the notion of crisis
in international politics and much of that research centers
on the classification of crisis situations.

At least one

study found nine different categories into which
international situations fall.s

Applying these criteria

to the situations in Greece and Turkey during 1947 has led
another author to conclude that these situations could have
forgone the crisis labels.
Charles Hermann's study of international crisis was
adopted by Michael Leigh in viewing the situations in Greece
and Turkey during 1947.6

Leigh found that these

situations more closely resembled the lowest of Hermann's
nine classifications:

the "administrative situation" rather

than the highest of the nine classifications:

"crisis."

The characteristics of the "administrative situation" are
"low threat, short time, and anticipated [events]."
According to Leigh, these were the characteristics of the
situations in Greece and Turkey rather than a crisis, which
is characterized by, "high threat, short time, and
surprise." 7
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On the other hand, one would have a difficult task
proving that government officials did not perceive the
situations in Greece and Turkey as crises.

Joseph Jones

argues that a crisis existed in Greece and Turkey. 8
George Kennan,9 Dean Acheson,10 and President
Truman,11 have all referred to the Greek-Turkish
situation in their memoirs as a crisis.

And from a

scholarly perspective on crisis, though not as rigorous as
that of Hermann, O'Neal and Berlel2 argue that the
historical data available suggest that a crisis did indeed
exist at the time.
As noted in a previous section of this paper,
The State Department Public Information
offices recommended a program ••. in order to
make the American people aware of the Greek
crisis."13
Freeland argues that the Truman administration and the
Truman Doctrine itself, "creat[ed] the crisis of March
1947."14

Freeland further argues,

••• it is difficult not to conclude that the
crisis of March 1947 had its origins in AmeriI~n
politics rather than developments in Greece."
Whether the situations in Greece or Turkey were ever
actually crises is questionable, but the notion that they
should be labeled as such is very important to the
manipulation theorists.

Edelman, for instance, argues
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National crises, therefore, have their uses in
shaping opinion •••• The twentieth century has seen
economic, military, and social crises succeed one
another, arg the forseeable future will not be
different.
Regarding the labeling of crisis by governments, Edelman
also notes,
People who benefit from a crisis are easily able
to explain it to themselves and to the mass public in
terms that mask or minimize their own contributions and
incentives while highlighting outside threats and
unexpected occurrences. The divergence between the
symbolic import of crises and theif material impact is
basic to their popular acceptance. 7
The Greek situation being labeled a crisis when the
objective evidence may not support such a label appears to
correspond with Edelman's interpretation of such a
classification.

The language used to support the claim that

the situations in Greece and Turkey were crises was also
ambiguous.

It is this language that will be the focus of

this paper.
The manipulation theorists argue that, with the tone
of the message being in the context of a crisis situation,
the threat was implanted in the minds of the American press,
Congress and public.

It then became the task of the

administration to nurture the threat with more ambiguous
terminology that both added to the threat by appearing to
explain the extent of the crisis, and reassuring the public
as to the methods by which the administration was meeting
the challenge of the threat.

Edelman notes,
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Any regime that prides itself on crisis management
is sure to find crises to manage, and crisis
management is always available as a way to mobilize
public support. 8
The language used to nurture the notion of crisis
contained the same emotive content that is discussed by
Edelman in his work, The Symbolic Uses of Politics.

These

words or phrases can be termed as key symbols or slogans.
Key symbols and slogans serve as emotional stimuli to an
audience or public which, according to Edelman, tends to
respond primarily based on their emotional rather than their
logical faculties.
According to Harold Lasswell, key symbols and
slogans,
provid[e] a common experience for everyone in the
state, ranging from the most powerful boss to the
humblest layman or philosopher. Indeed, one of the few
experiences that bind human beings together,
irrespective of race, region, occupation, party or
religion, is exposure to the same set of key words.
Sentiments of loyalty cluster around these terT~' and
contribute to the loyalty of the commonwealth.
Edelman argues that, in addition to having a sentimental
appeal to the commonwealth, key symbols have the ability to
stimulate perceptions of threat and assurance to the public
audience, this of course, depending on the symbol used.

The

main characteristic of the symbols commonly used in the
rhetoric of politics is the ambiguity attached to each term.
It is this ambiguity which, many would suggest, allows the
public to be seduced or enraged by the symbols employed by
the administration.
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Some symbols seem to emerge as ones which the
administration emphasized when drafting the Truman Doctrine.
This section of the paper will attempt to analyze the
March 12, 1947 Presidential address for terms or phrases
which could be considered symbolic, or could have been
inserted to ensure public support.

Perhaps the most obvious

of the symbols employed by the Truman Doctrine is concept
"democracy."

The adjective "democratic" was questionable,

to say the least, when applied to the Greek state of
1947.20

Truman and his staff knew this fact, yet the

speech contained three specific references made about the
Greek state using some form of the word democratic prior to
Truman's admonition of Greece for its "extremist measures."
Perhaps those who drafted the Truman Doctrine saw the
value in using such terms.

Edelman suggests that the term

"democracy" is symbolic2 1 in that it suggests to
Americans that the government in question is legitimate and,
in fact, conducts its internal affairs in the same way in
which they are conducted in the United States.

Thus,

"democracy" appeals to the American Public, it is synonymous
with the American perception of good government.

It appeals

to the myth of citizen participation which has been
ingrained in the American belief system through a variety of
cultural processes.
It could be argued that, by employing the term
democracy and the emotional baggage which the term carries
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with it, the Truman administration was casting the mold for
the American public to perceive Greece as a friendly ally.
Whether the administration was exaggerating the facts is a
point of debate.

It is clear, however, that the American

public had little general knowledge of the situation within
Greece and Turkey prior to the Truman Doctrine.

This fact

is evidenced by a poll taken in March of 1947, asking the
American people questions about their knowledge of the
political situations within Greece and Turkey, Csee
appendix, Table 4).

In each case the percentage of the

American public with "no opinion" or no knowledge of the
internal political climates of Greece and Turkey was higher
than those answering either yes or no.

According to the

manipulation theorists, the fact that the American public
was not aware of the situation in Greece and Turkey, and for
the most part, was not even aware of the types of
governments in these countries, suggests that the language
employed by the Truman Doctrine, especially the references
to a "democratic" Greek state, was implanted to build the
perception among the American public that Greece and Turkey
were friendly allies and deserved United States assistance.
Numerous other symbols were employed by the drafters
of the Truman Doctrine.

A review of the text of the speech

yields many terms which would fall into the categories
established by Edelman and Lasswell.

Among these other

symbols to be found in the text of the Truman Doctrine

43

are those on the positive, or as noted by Lasswell,
"indulgent" side, meaning those symbols which provide

assurances; and on the other, "deprivation"22 side we
find terms to evoke negative emotions or threats, (see
appendix, Table 5).
That the American public was virtually unaware of
events in Greece and Turkey, or in most areas of the world
at that time, is evidenced by passages and polls cited
above.

The arguments by Edelman, Lasswell and Bennett state

that symbolic language serves as a cue for the uninformed
voter.

This type of language elicits a response, either

positive or negative depending on the symbol employed, and
this response dictates the attitude or opinions which a good
deal of the public will have regarding the issue in
question.
Authors such as Leigh, Freeland, Graber, Barnet, and
Kolko argue that the language of the Truman Doctrine and the
press coverage, both prior to and after this speech, was
engineered by the administration, specifically the State,
War, Navy Coordinating Committee, Undersecretary Acheson,
Clark Clifford and various other individuals who advised the
committee.

Jones notes that prior to the announcement by

Truman on March 12, 1947 a campaign was conducted by the
members of the SWNCC and the State Department Public
Information Off ice to persuade the members of the press of
the need for the Greek aid.

Acheson held background talks
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with representatives of the press and radio
broadcasters,23 these talks were productive, "News and
radio men collected and spread the pollen of information and
speculation among Congressmen, government officials, and the
public."24

Jones further notes,

If the government was reluctant to speak publicly
of the decline in British power and to suggest that the
time had come when any hope for peace and well-being in
the world required that the United States step into the
role formerly played by Great Britain, publi~
commentators and editorial writers were not. 5
Whether the public information campaigns and the
background talks had any great effect on the outcome of the
press and ultimately the public support for the
Greek-Turkish aid is questionable at this point.

Certainly,

if the arguments of Edelman and others are valid, and the
general public responds to symbolic language in an emotional
way, then the members of the press are likely to respond in
a similar fashion.

The literature on the subject of press

response to government information campaign is varied.

At

least one author maintains that the press tended to respond
to "cues" furnished by the administration.26

This

notion of cues suggests that some type of semantic or
psychological stimulus was presented by the administration
that the press responded to and subsequently, relayed to the
American public.

It has been argued that the type of

stimuli employed by the administration in the case of the
Truman Doctrine were verbal and non-verbal symbols.
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The above argument suggests that the press is often
"used" by government officials to advance policy.

While

this argument is true in many respects, it is misleading to
assume that the press is in collusion with the
administration in an attempt to dupe the American public
into accepting policy.

For the most part, the press is

reluctant to admit that they are ever "used by government
officials. 27
11

Yet even when the press is being used

they are doing their job.

Bernard Cohen notes,

If you have a policy, you have something that
makes a good story for a reporter ••• The news agency may
grumble and call it 'propaganda' but they dutifully
report as 'hard news' most of what the State Department
News Officer offers them by way
official Department
statements at his noon briefings. 8

05

Cohen argues that because the press is constrained by
its neutrality in reporting foreign affairs, it
more easily lends itself to the uses of others and
particularly to public officials whom reporters have
come to regard as prime sources of news ~grely by
virtue of their positions in government.
While these arguments seem to suggest that a confidence
exists between press and government people, they do not
necessarily suggest

that the press will respond to the

symbolic language in a way similar to the general public.
Indeed, one would expect that most foreign affairs or
administration reporters would be familiar enough with the
ways of Washington that they would attempt to by-pass
primary thought processes and view the aid proposals in
their realistic meaning.

While in some cases this

46
expectation is fulfilled, in many instances it is not.
According to Cohen,
Those who are concerned with [the] images of the
world will note that the way the press goes about
shaping the pattern of public information is not
characterized by any orderly or systematic approach to
the substance of foreign affairs, nor by any explicit
understanding of what public information might usefully
consist in.3
Thus, Cohen appears to be arguing that since the press
is primarily unfamiliar with and unaware of the complexities
of foreign affairs, as is the general public, they are in
the same position to be affected by the emotional appeals
and symbolic language of government officials.

If this is

so, and the arguments of Cohen and others are accepted, then
this would seem to support arguments of those who maintain
that government officials direct press and public response
to political issues.

However, while the evidence thus far

presented might tend to support such assertions, another
body of literature might tend to dispute them.
Some have suggested that the press serves as a
restricting force on what is possible in the area of foreign
affairs.31

One study has even suggested that the press,

specifically the printed media, performs an "agenda setting"
function for the mass public.32
The main media force attention to certain issues.
They build up public images of political figures. They
are constantly presenting objects suggesting what
individuals in the m~~s should think about, know about,
have feelings about.
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This latter body of literature would appear to contradict
the information presented by Cohen which argues that elites
and top government officials direct messages to individuals
in the press who merely relay these messages to the public.
A study with similar findings about the agenda setting
function of the mass media concludes the following,
We do not mean our results to be taken as an
indication of political mischief at the networks. In
deciding what to cover, editors and journalists are
influenced most by organizational routines, internal
power struggles, and commercial imperativ~~· This
leaves little room for political motives.
Such statements provide the student of foreign policy
with a perplexing problem.

It is difficult to accept the

arguments that so-called political elites are in a position
to manipulate the press, and there-by the mass public, when
evidence suggests that the press is more directed by its own
bureaucratic structure and desire to sell papers.

Moreover,

it is difficult to accept all of the claims made by those
who argue that opinion is manipulated by symbolic language.
Clearly, parts of their arguments make sense, but one
remains skeptical.

To rely, as do Leigh, Freeland, Barnett,

Kolko and others, on the evidence presented is insufficient
for one to conclude that elites manipulated opinion with the
Truman Doctrine.
Perhaps evidence is available to resolve our problems.
If an analysis of the press coverage during the weeks
surrounding the March 12, 1948 announcement of the Truman
Doctrine is conducted, one might observe similarities
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between the language used by the press in its editorial
comment and that of those so called elites to determine if
there is any evidence of manipulation.

In addition, by

viewing the text of speeches, memoirs, public and private
documents of these elites one might find positive evidence
of plans for manipulation.

If so, this might prove

conclusively that it existed.
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THE ROLE OF BELIEF SYSTEM
An analysis of the press coverage, primarily the
editorial coverage, should provide evidence to support or
deny that the use of symbolic language was instrumental in
building a public consensus for the Greek-Turkish aid
proposals.

Past studies give an indication of what form

this analysis should take.

Harold Lasswell and others

analyzed pre-war and wartime propaganda through the German
and American press.

Using content analysis Lasswell

concluded that the appeal of emotional or symbolic language
is quite forceful as a means of domestic propaganda for
supporting foreign policies.l

This is consistent with the

works of Edelman and Bennett, but is directed more
specifically to the area of foreign, rather than domestic
policies.
Lasswell's analysis was extensive in its scope;
reviewing countless volumes of periodicals and newspapers
for many months, he identified and weighted specific words
and phrases for their symbolic value and then coded the
statistical data to record frequencies of usage of the
terrns. 2
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This study is intended to follow along a course
similar to that of Lasswells, yet not in such an
exhaustive manner.

We may even find evidence and

arguments to challenge those of Lasswell.

If, as

Bernard Cohen argues, in their zeal to persuade the
American public to accept the administration's policy
proposals, the opponents of public information programs
often cross the "dividing line between education and
propaganda, 114 it seems important to determine whether
this line was crossed in the campaign for the Truman
Doctrine.
This study will observe editorial coverage of the
events in Greece and Turkey during the interim two week
period between the submission of the British notes
regarding the ceasing of support for Greece and the
announcement of the Truman Doctrine.

Editorial coverage

was chosen because one can observe quite clearly just what
a columnist thinks about a specific issue, and this is
often an indication of what the general public thinks.
Moreover, through the language a columnist uses to
describe the situation one can often find instances of
symbolism.

One might assume that if propaganda techniques

being employed by the administration are being responded
to by columnists, then in all probability there will be a
similar response by the public.

Most of the authors
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on the subject of symbolism argued that symbols affect all
levels of society in similar ways.
The sources of the editorial coverage were the New
York Times and the Washington Post.

These sources were

chosen because they have consistently had a reputation as
"prestige papers. 115

In other words, both papers regularly

include virtually all the information regarding foreign
affairs available to the press.

Regarding the New York

Times, Cohen notes,
the Times is the newspaper of record •••• It is the
source which is ref erred to by virtually everyone in
government who hgs an interest or a responsibility in
foreign affairs.
In addition to the above factors, two of the sources for
this paper have suggested that the reporters and columnists
of the Times and Post were the individuals to whom the
administration primarily targeted their information
campaign.
Cornwell.7

Jones suggests this in his text as does
Jones goes as far as to name some of the

columnists working for the Times or the Post with whom
government people regularly keep in contact in order to
cultivate a confidential relationship. 8
The Washington Post and the New York Times both
presented a relatively favorable treatment of the aid
program in the initial weeks.

In viewing the editorial

comment one sees this in both the editorial staff and the
columnists of both papers.
favorable and supportive.

Overall, commentary appeared
If one concentrates on observing
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these editorials for instances of symbolic or emotional
language, one can find examples of their usage.

If we

recall that symbolic language is that which elicits an
emotional response from the audience, either a threat or an
assurance, then it merely becomes the task of the analyst to
read tne commentary to determine whether the language used
could be judged as emotional.

Indeed, the works by Lasswell

and others suggest a variety of words and phrases which fall
into the category of symbolic language.

Often symbolic

language, it should be remembered, is emotional without
being very specific.

The ambiguity of this language is what

makes it so effective in persuading people towards a
specific course of action.
Beginning with the Washington Post, from the day after
the British submitted the notes to the State Department
concerning Greece and Turkey, the editorial comment of the
Post appeared favorable to such a program.

Much of the

reportage included terms and phrases which could be
considered consistent with the criteria established by
Lasswell, Edelman, Bennett and others for symbolic language.
In the March 1, 1947 issue an editorial appeared titled
World Crisis in which the following sentence held a
prominent location,
A statesman thinks of the next generation not
the next election and there will be no next
generation if we ~o not grapple with our world
responsibilities.
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Clearly the threat implied by this sentence is obvious,
however, in the sentence as well as in the column, the
threat is never fully explained but is left relatively
ambiguous.

We know that we should fear the Communists and

that we will have to face up to them but what is never
specifically explained is why.
On March 3, an editorial by Joseph Alsop employed the
following passages,
In the past weeks the optimistic foundation of
American world policy has quite literally been
shattered by a series of hammer blows, President
Truman has to decide what to do about it ..•• The
Greek situation began to deteriorate. The rising
Greek crisis imposed demands which the British
government lacked resources to meet •••• The security
of Turkey depends on Greece •••• The facts of the world
situation, so they say, urgently require broad scale
action. The best approach, therefore, is to base the
appeal to Congress on the real issue. This, the
American people will understand.lo
The threats in the preceding passages by Alsop are
apparent as is the reassurance that swift American action
and resolve by the American people can halt the
deterioration of American security throughout the world,
and this swift action will come about by a clear presentation
of the facts to the American public.

What also is suggested

in the preceding passages is the fact that Alsop might be
getting his information from some source within the
administration.

This is evident by the statement made by

Alsop regarding a need for action.

Alsop states in the

middle of the sentence, "so they say."

Apparently, "they"

could be someone in the administration explaining to Alsop
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in somewhat dramatic terms the course American policy must
take.
Other columns in the Post during that week carried a
similar message and the points were made using similar
language.

On March 4, in a column by Mark Sullivan titled

"U.S. Must Assume World Leadership," the following passage
was printed.
The hour is here when the United States must
announce that it accepts its own destiny as the chief
world power. We must fulfill the demands of that
position, no matter what it costs if we eventually,
along with other people, are to survive as free
men. 11
In a column, in the March 9 issue of the Post titled
"A Test Case in Greece," Andre Visson called the Middle
East, referring to Greece and Turkey, the "worlds number 1
powderkeg" and argued, "it is a great responsibility, but we
must assume it, for the alternative would be further Soviet
expansion. 012
Also in the March 9 issue of the Post columnist
Marquis Childs penned the following,
Disorder and anarchy threaten in large areas of the
earth.
Greece is a small example of a mere pinpoint on
the tapestry that shows fhe apocalyptic horsemen on the
not too distant horizon. 3
(emphasis added)
On March 10 in an editorial by Barnett Never, titled
"New Policy for a Troubled Age," the following passages were
cited,
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It is not enough to supply aid to Greece, we should
strengthen the truly democratic forces in that Balkan
Kingdom •••• If we fail in Greece either b1 default or
incompetence our troubles will multiply. 4
(emphasis added)
And on March 12, the day of the President's announcement, the
Post printed the following editorial comments.
The United States is the enemy of aggression - the
sworn enemy by reason of her commitments under the
United Nations, the natural enemy by reason of her
power. President Truman will presumably make this idea
today. 15
(emphasis added)
Sumner Welles in his article titled "Democratic World
Looks to U.S." printed the following, "the chestnuts are
American as well as British."

Welles also states:

The issue could not be plainer, if the United States
acquieses to the extension of Soviet domination over
Greece, Turkey will soon therafter come within the Soviet
orbit. The Levant, the Arab Statef and North Africa will
then lie open to Soviet expansion. 6 (emphasis added)
The preceeding passages suggest a variety of things
about the use of symbolic language by the Press.

From the

discussion of a new "destiny" for the United States in the
World by Mark Sullivan and Andre Visson to the threatening
forecasts and biblical allusions of Sumner Welles and Marquis
Childs.

Also included in the columns were numerous

references to democracy, freedom, security, peace, etc. but
seldom any specific mention of what the true threat might
have been, the references were always clouded by the often
dramatic yet seldom clear language of political rhetoric.
Only occasionally was any reference made to the possibility
that a U.S. response in Greece and Turkey was necessitated by
a vacuum in the balance of power.
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The case of the New York Times is similar to that of
the Washington Post.

Hanson

w.

Baldwin, for example,

writing in the March 2 issue of the New York Times in an
article favored a "world role" for the U.S.

He also noted

that it was important that the U.S. must "avert the decline
of the Western civilization, and a reversion to nihilism and
the dark ages."

He attributed this decline to the

"aggressive and expanding power if the Soviet Union."17
On March 3, the Times editorial staff printed the
following:
Truman's request for $350,000,000 ••• to back up
Greece and keep the key citadel of the eastern
Mediterranean and the whole Miig1e East from being
inundated by the Russian tide.
(emphasis added)
On March 5, columnist James Reston printed the
following regarding the situation in Greece,
it is not a conflict between left and right
but between those who ~elieve in civil rights
and those who do not.l
On March 9, Reston stated "the communist menace to an
unsupported Greece is real. 1120

On March 12 Res ton

stated "The danger of a communist flood is apparent."21
And finally, on the day that Truman was to make his
announcement to Congress, the Times staff printed the
following:
(The United States) will ring down the curtain
on an epoch in America's foreign policy and begin
a new chapter •••• The United States has taken its
position in the front ranks among nations determined to
check the further expansion of Russian dominati~~ and
to strengthen the frontiers of Western freedom.
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Again in the preceding passages from the Times one
sees the utilization of symbolic or highly emotive language

in reference to the Greek situation.

From Baldwin's fears

of the "decline of the Western civilization and a reversion
to the nihilism of the dark ages" to Reston's "inundation by
the Russian tide" one can see examples of overly dramatic
explanations of events.

If one carefully views events in

Greece and Turkey from the objective historical accounts of
what happened, one begins to see a picture appear that is
neither extremely threatening nor suggestive of an imminent
crisis.23

What appeared to be occurring were civil wars

in states which had corrupt governments.

Those trying to

overthrow the governments in these states-primarily
disaffected members of the military and political
parties2 4 -were receiving support from the Soviets.

The

threat of a "Russian tide" is hardly implied by this.

Most

authors, including George Kennan, the architect of
containment policy, have maintained that the threats were
not as great as they were made out to be.

Kennan notes that

he and others in the State Department saw the threat as
being more political than military.25

Indeed the

research by Charles Hermann indicates that the threat was
neither high nor imminent.

One must ask then, why were the

presentations in the press so dramatic.
Perhaps it would have been more appropriate for the
columnists to discuss the situations in their realistic or
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power politics context.

Two states emerging from a world

war more powerful than any other states on the planet would
naturally be threatened by each other because of their
capabilities for achieving their competing interests.

The

vacuum left in the balance after the axis powers had been
defeated and England had been devastated thrust both the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. into positions which had traditionally
been held by the large European states in balancing and
preventing countervailing power to prevent the other side
from aggression. 26

It is precisely this type of

activity which George Kennan argued in his long telegram
from Moscow,27 and the famous "X" 2 8 article.

He

viewed the activities of the Soviet Union in terms of power
politics, not solely of ideological opposition between East
and West.

Yet with minor exceptions as seen earlier, much

of the justifications for aid by columnists was in
ideological terms.

Some evidence suggests that a

presentation of the facts in terms of power politics might
not have been successful.

John Spanier has noted that in

the immediate period following World War II there existed an
attitude among the American people that things should return
to normal.
The United States had historically drawn a
clear-cut distinction between war and peace in its
approach to foreign policy.
Peace was characterized by
a state of harmony among nations; power politics, on the
other hand, was considered abnormal and war a crime.
In
peacetime, one needed to pay little or no attention to
foreign problems; indeed to do so would have diverted
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men from their individual, materialistic concerns
and upset the whole scale of social values. The effect
of this attitude was clear:

Americans turned their

attention toward the outside world with reluctance and
usually only when they felt provoked--that is when the
foreign menace had become so clear that it could no
longer be ignored.29
This isolationist attitude was also prevalent among
many members of Congress and it was this sentiment which
most of the authors who wrote about the Truman Doctrine said
needed to be overcome.30

When the success of Acheson's

dramatic presentation to congressional leaders was seen, it
was decided that a similar presentation should be made to
the American press and public.

Thus, a presentation was

devised and delivered to the public on March 12, 1947 which
requested large amounts of aid and assistance, and employed
numerous terms and phrases which could be considered
symbolic.31

The question remains:

to what extent were

so called elites within the administration manipulating
opinion through the deliberate use of imprecise language to
confuse the public and elicit a response arrived at through
a primary or emotional thought process.

In addition, if

administration elites were indeed manipulating opinion, when
and how did they cross the dividing line between education
and propaganda.
These seem to be important questions which to this
point have been unanswered by the evidence presented.
Perhaps some answers can be found in the biographies and
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autobiographies of those individuals most influential in the
decision making process.

If one is to prove that manipulation of opinion
through the deliberate use of emotional rhetoric existed,
one need also prove that those doing the manipulating fully
understood the situations in a rational way and fully
understood the uses of symbolism and propaganda in the
context of mass persuasion.

If deliberate intent cannot be

proven then one has merely made a case for education, not
manipulation.

In other words, if evidence suggests that the

officials responsible for devising the wording of the Truman
Doctrine actually perceived the threat in ideological terms
and crisis fear then it would be difficult to suggest that
they were deliberately manipulating opinion.

Their

activities of mobilizing support would probably fall into
the category of education, or to use Berry's term,
"teaching" the public.
To begin with, the memoirs of President Truman shed
some light onto the preceptions of the individual most
prominent in the decision making process.32
When reading President Truman's memoirs, especially
regarding the era of the Cold War and the Truman Doctrine,
one is immediately struck by the highly emotional and
ideologically symbolic terms with which Truman apparently
perceived the Greek and Turkish situations.
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The ideas and traditions of our nation demanded
that we come to the aid of Greece and Turkey and that we
put the world on notice that it would be our policy to
support the ~ause of freedom whenever it was
threatened. 3
This type of language in reference to the situations in
Greece and Turkey is consistent with the notion that key
symbols and slogans have a similar appeal to society as a
whole.

Lasswell, Edelman and Bennett all argue that

cultural processes direct the way in which these individuals
respond to symbolic messages or cues.

One can, therefore,

presume that these cultural processes will affect the way in
which individuals will perceive domestic and international
affairs.

Henry Kissinger argues,

It is part of our folklore that, while other
nations have interests we have responsibilities;
while other nations are concerned with equilibrium,
we are ~oncerned with the legal requirements of
peace. 3
Thus it is quite possible, and indeed highly likely
based on a reading of his memoirs, that President Truman
genuinely perceived events in Greece and Turkey as crises,
assaults on freedom, and a clash between democracy and
communism, rather than solely as threats to the power
interests of the United States.

Some have argued that this

was precisely the case and that Truman's perceptions of
Soviet conflict were primarily effected by the opinions of
James Forrestal, George Kennan and Dean Acheson.3 5
Truman argues,

!
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What course the free world should take in the
face of the threat of Russian Totalitarianism was a
subject I had discussed with my foreign policy advisers
on many occasions in the years just past •••• The studies
which Marshall and Acheson brought to me and which we
examined together made it plain that serious risks would
be involved. But the alternative would be disastrous to
our securit~ and to the security of free nations
everywhere. 6
It is, therefore, quite possible that Blanchard is
correct, and Truman's perceptions were indeed affected by
the influence of his advisers.

James Forrestal, for example

makes quite a few references to discussions he had with the
President and cabinet members, where Greece and Turkey were
the topic.37

Arthur Rogow, who wrote Forrestal's

biography called Forrestal an "ardent anti-communist" and
points out that it was Forrestal who seized onto Kennan's
reports as evidence that Soviet ideology was the main threat
to international peace.38

One can find numerous

references to Forrestal's opinions of communism when reading
his memoirs.

LaFebre notes that Forrestal sent Truman a

"highly emotional memorandum" on March 7, 1947.

His note

suggested that the threat in Greece and Turkey equalled that
of World War II.
Acheson, as well appears to affirm that his perception
of the Greek-Turkish situations was one of a communist
threat primarily based on a conflict of ideologies, not a
power struggle for political influence and allies.
notes,

Acheson
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Only slowly did it dawn upon us that the whole
world structure and order that we had inherited from the
nineteenth century was gone and that the struggle to

replace it would be directed from two bitterly ~~posed
and ideologically irreconcilable power centers.
These statements indicate that Acheson was aware of
the fact that while balance of power concerns were
important, it was primarily a conflict of ideologies.

Lloyd

Gardiner appears to agree with this assessment of Acheson's
views.
The real issue, wrote Louis Halle, one of Acheson's
associates in the State Department at the time of the
Truman Doctrine, was the balance of power: "As in 1917,
as in 1941, it was still not possible to tell the
American people what the real issue was." Halle's
effort to put the cold war into a "realistic" mold might
do justice to ~achiavelli, but not to the convictions of
Dean Acheson.4
Much evidence, therefore seems to suggest that Acheson
genuinely perceived the conflict in the terms in which he
annunciated to his associates and superiors.

McLellan notes

about Acheson
••• his convictions about individual freedom
were salient and vital and not simply i~ ideological
mask for economic and elite interests.
While no evidence could be found to refute the argument that
Acheson genuinely "understood" the Greek-Turkish situation
in the same way he described it, evidence does exist that
suggest he was aware of the uses of symbolic language as a
form of political control.

In a 1946 speech to the Harvard

Club Acheson acknowledged that "propaganda, which uses
familiar and respected words and ideas to implant images,"
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is a standard practice among states for inducing behavior.
This practice included something which Acheson called the
"new psychology of crisis. 0 42
Although this does not imply that propaganda or
symbolic language was deliberately used to induce behavior
in the case of Acheson's presentations and drafting the
speech, it does indicate that he could have knowingly done
so.

McLellan notes about Acheson's "dramatic" presentation

to Congressional leaders, "what Acheson had to say was said
with the deliberate intention of stimulating his
listeners. 043
While certain evidence exists on both sides of the
coin regarding Acheson's intentions, it would appear that
the bulk of the evidence would tend to indicate that Acheson
genuinely perceived the Greek-Turkish situations in crisis
terms and as an ideological conflict between the United
States representing freedom, and the Soviet Union
representing totalitarianism.
As for George Kennan, the reverse seems to be the
case.

The Kennan memorandum sent from Moscow to Washington

in February of 1946 has been seen by many as the primary
motivation and justification being the policies undertaken
by the United States regarding the Soviet Union in the
post-war era.

Kennan's telegram outlined his own

perceptions of the Soviet threat.

This document consisted

of five separate parts each covering a specific aspect of
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Soviet-American relations.

Much of Kennan's analysis of the

conflict between the two states appeared to be centered on
the ideological clash between communism and capitalism; the
discussion ranged from viewing Soviet propaganda statements
and party line to offering suggestions for U.S. policies vis
a vis the Soviets.

However, references to the seeking and

maintenance of power and alliances by both states are
abundant in the memo.

This indicates that Kennan perceived

that the true nature of the conflict might indeed be a
balancing of power between the two sides.

Regarding

possible activities of the Soviet state which must be
watched, Kennan notes,
Internal policies devoted to increasing in every
way strength and prestige of the Soviet state; intensive
military industrialization; maximum development of armed
forces; great displays to impress outsides; continual
secretiveness about internal matters, designed to
conceil weaknesses and keep opponents in the
dark.
Regarding the directions the United States should take in
response to these Soviet activities, Kennan notes:
[Soviet power isl impervious to logic of reason,
and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this
reason it can easily withdraw-and usually does-when
strong resistance is encountered at any point. This if
the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his
readiness to use it, he solely has to do so. If
situations are properly handled there need be no
prestige-engaging showdowns •••• Gauged against Western
world as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker
force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree
of cohesion, firmness, and vigor which Western world can
muster. And igis is factor which it is within our power
to influence.
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Clearly, what Kennan is describing in these two
excerpts from his telegram is a classic power confrontation
between the two central actors in the balance.

The

terminology used by Kennan-defining relations among states,
and interests of states in terms of power, and discussions of
gaining and maintaining alliances-is consistent with the
realist school of international politics.

The inference is

that Kennan must have understood that the U.S.-Soviet
conflict was not merely a clash between ideologies but a
clash between the most powerful and predominant actors in
international politics.

However, if one continues :to read

the Kennan telegram, it becomes apparent that Kennan would
occasionally use ideological or emotional terms to describe
the conflict.

"World communism is like malignant parasite

which feeds only on diseased tissue."46
In foreign countries Communists will, as a
rule, work toward destruction of all forms oa personal
independence; economic, political or moral." 7
Indeed, in his memoirs Kennan argues regarding the
Moscow telegram,
I read it over today with a horrified amusement.
Much of it reads exactly like one of those primers put
out by alarmed Congressional committees or by the
Daughters of the American Revolution, designed to
arous7 the i~tizenry to the threat of the Communist
conspiracy.
So it appears quite possible that Kennan, as well as
Acheson, Truman and Forrestal "understood" the situation in
Greece, at the time, in the emotional terms in which it was
presented to the American public.

While it is also possible

70

that after the fact, they might have come to understand the
events in the context of power politics, it is, perhaps,
more likely, that in the initial stages of the conflict they
understood it in the same type of black and white, good
versus bad type of terms in which our culture tends to view
things.

Kennan notes in his memoirs that he later regretted

the language of the Truman Doctrine, because
We would find it necessary to give aid, over the
ensuing years, to a number of regimes which would hardly
qualify foi it on the basis of their democratic
character. 9
While this passage clearly reflects Kennan's awareness of
the non-ideological necessities of power politics alliances,
it must be remembered that it was written many years after
the Truman Doctrine.

Morganthau notes,

The actor on the political scene cannot help
•playing an act" by concealing the true nature of his
political actions behind the mask of a political
ideology. The more removed the individual is from a
particular power struggle, ~Be more likely he is to
understand its true nature.
Thus, while as an author, in later years, Kennan might
have clearly or realistically understood the situation, in
his years as an actor in the policy process, he might have
genuinely perceived the Greek-Turkish situation in emotional
crisis terms.

Kennan's analysis of Soviet intentions

however, and his proposals for United States policy regarding
the Soviets has been classified as being a realist or
•particularist• 51 position: but, it has also been argued
that Kennan perceived ideology to be an important element
because the Soviets had been using the ideology of communism
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as "an instrument with which to project influence beyond
Russian borders. 1152

It is thus:" difficult to accurately

assess what position Kennan genuinely had regarding the
events of 1946-1947, but it does appear that the possibility
exists that Kennan might have perceived the situation in
ideological terms.

Certainly his report served as the

foundation for the decision makers understanding, of the
situation, and the preceeding pages have indicated that they
appeared to understand the situation in an "idealist" rather
than a strictly "realist" perspective.
In addition to Kennan's memorandum and subsequent
article in Foreign Affairs, 53 it has been argued that
other documents played an important role in determining the
United States policy of containing the Soviets. 54

While

these documents probably served to formulate the goals of
containment, they also might have provided policy makers
with the means for achieving them.
Language similar to that in the Kennan memorandum can
be found in the "Top Secret• communications sent to
President Truman by his advisors.

The first of these

documents, sent to the President on September 24, 1946, was
drafted by special counsel to the President, Clark
Clifford,
after consultations with the Secretaries of
State, War, Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Attorney General, the Director of c5gtral Intelligence
and other administration officials.
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The document essentially was an attempt to formulate a
coherent policy for the United States regarding the Soviet
Union and tended to adopt the view of the Soviets put forth
by Kennan in his telegram.

Indeed much of what Clifford

called for in his proposals paralleled those put forth by
Kennan.
The language of the Clifford memorandum, like the
Kennan memorandum, tended to highlight ideological
differences between the Soviets and the United States as
being one of the major sources of the dispute.

Clifford

argues that the security of the United States, the Soviet
Union,
and the rest of the World as well, is being
jeopardized by aggressive military imperialism
much as ~gat in which the Soviet Union is now
engaged.
Clifford also refers to the need for the United States to
•support and assist all democratic countries which are in
any way menaced by the Soviet Union;" 57 he also
suggested that
the United States has no aggressive intentions
and that the nature of our society is such that
peaceful coexistenc5 of capitalistic and communistic
states is possible. 8
In addition to this type of emotional language, however, one
notices many passages which imply that Clifford and his
contributors were aware of the conflict in its power
politics context.

For example,
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The language of military power is the only ·
language which disciples of power politics understand.
The United States must use that language in order that
Soviet leaders will realize that our government is

determined to uphold the int5~sts of its citizens and
the rights of small nations.
Other passages indicate that Clifford and his
co-authors were aware of the uses of propaganda and symbolic
language as a means of public persuasion.
The United States should realize that Soviet
propaganda is dangerous (especially when American
"imperialism" is emphasized) and should avoid any
actions ~Bich give an appearance of truth to Soviet
charges.
Again, one is left without a clear picture of what was
the perception of those individuals in the information
relaying roles.

While it might appear, from their rhetoric

that ideology played the primary role in their policies
regarding the Soviets, it appears that power concerns were
also given consideration by those formulating these
policies.
One last document is argued as having been of primary
importance in contributing to the knowledge and perceptions
of those formulating the policies regarding the Soviets, and
the aid policies regarding other countries.6 1
This document, issued by the joint chiefs of staff,
maintained that certain areas had higher priorities for aid
and assistance, based on their "importance to the national
security of the United States. 1162

Seemingly stressing

power politics considerations as the motivation for policy,
the document makes numerous references to "the event of
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war with our ideological enemies"; suggesting that a
motivation for a policy of containment, achieved by means of
foreign assistance, might indeed be idealistic as well as
realistic or strategic.

This type of emotional and

calculated rhetoric is repeated throughout the document, and
in the.context of whether policy makes had specific notions
of what motivated their decisions is primarily confusing.
If, as many manipulation theorists have argued, policy makes
indeed perceived power politics considerations as the
primary motivation behind their decisions to supply aid to
countries, then emphasizing ideological differences between
states or opponents should have been used primarily as the
means for marshalling public support.

It would not be

likely that these ideological statements would show up in
the private papers of policy makers if they were merely
employed for their symbolic value.

Indeed, one might expect

to find some mention of any attempted manipulation, or at
least, statements which would imply such manipulation.
these statemetns were not to be found in this research.

But
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CONCLUSIONS
The central question of this paper has essentially
been is there sufficient evidence available to justify
claims of "manipulation of opinion" of the American public
with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, or does it
appear that what occurred could have been, more
appropriately, termed an informational or educational
campaign?

In other words, were the tone and the rhetoric of

the President's message strategically designed to elicit a
response from an apathetic public and a hesitant congress,
and, if so, was there some purpose other than idealism which
motivated American actions regarding the supplying of aid?
While there is certainly some evidence that the
administration tended to employ rather dramatic, if not
indeed symbolic, language in presenting the issue, there
appears to be no solid proof to lead one to conclude that
any "manipulation" occurred.

One might even conclude that

evidence appears to indicate that those so-called elites who
formulated the containment policy and the means used to
achieve it genuinely understood the situation, in its
initial stages, in the same terms which they employed in
their public rhetoric, implying that they were not being
deceptive when presenting issues to the public.
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The evidence compiled by reviewing the autobiographies
and biographies of the main actors, and the official

government documents of the period appears to indicate that
those elites in the policy process had perceptions of the
issues which framed them as questions of morality and
ideology more so than questions of national interest defined
in terms of acquiring power or economic gain.

For the most

part, it appears that Truman, Acheson, Kennan, Jones and
other members of the administration described in memoirs and
to friends their perceptions of the Greek-Turkish situation
in the same way in which the situation was presented to the
public on March 12, 1947.

It is therefore, unlikely that a

conspiracy to deceive the American public and attain support
by deliberately manipulating information and language was
carried out; or at least, it is unlikely that such a
conspiracy could be clearly shown.
While it is certainly possible that these individuals
carried on deception when they wrote their memoirs, this is
probably not the case.

To begin with, memoirs are generally

accepted as accurate representations of an individuals
perceptions of issues.

Moreover, if it was manipulation, one

must assume a vast amount of knowledge or awareness about the
public on the part of the administration that just didn't
appear to exist.
The newspaper coverage of the period is also important
to this story.

The language used by the press, which
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was prominent in the weeks prior to the announcement of the
Truman Doctrine is quite similar in its tone to that employed
by Truman in his public rhetoric.

It was often emotionally

laden and it employed numerous references to crisis, threats,
democracy, freedom, Communism and other terms and phrases
which arguably could fall within the parameters of symbolic
language.
It is possible to infer a number of things about the
press coverage.

For instance, one might assume, as would

Cohen 1 that the language was similar because press people
are ready to accept all the information that government
officials relate to the press, be it propaganda or not.
Since many historians of this period have pointed out that
both official2 and unofficial3 actors seemed to supply
information to the press during this period many have
suggested that the press was essentially led along the
propaganda path.
Still another scenario would have the press leading the
administration in its perceptions of the issues.4

Since

the press coverage preceded most of the public rhetoric on
the issue, it is possible that this coverage colored the
administration's thinking on the issue. Most would contend,
however, that officials in a government are not often
affected by perceptions of issues held among the press and
the public.

In most cases, government officials form their

perceptions of events and issues in foreign policy from
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a variety of influences, perhaps the least important being
the press and the public.s
Finally, a third inference one might gain by an
examination of the press coverage, and indeed the public and
private comments of the central actors in the formulation of
the Truman Doctrine, is that one of the key variables which
affects perceptions, anyone's perceptions, about issues of
foreign relations, is that of a belief system.

The best

information available to decision makers and press people,
must first filter through their belief system to be
understood.

This belief system then, certainly colors any

understanding of an issue, and this directs the way in which
individuals phrase their perception of issues when attempting
to relay this information to others or educate them.
The fact that there was a similarity in rhetoric
between the press and the decision making elites within the
administration suggests that a common belief system exists in
the United States which affects even the most rational
thinking and cynical levels of our society.

And, perhaps,

this belief system is what Bennett, Edelman, and Lasswell
refer to when they discuss the notion of cultural processes
and myths affecting the way Americans understand politics and
direct the way they respond to political language.

Taken one

step further, however, one might presume that these cultural
processes and myths also effect the way in which decision
makers genuinely understand the issues and this would
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certainly direct their rhetoric.

Again we are back to the

question of whether officials in the government are aware of
the facility with which opinion can be manipulated and,
therefore, make calculated attempts to do so.

Both Edelman

and Lasswell appear to be clear on this point; Edelman argues
that in general American politics is consistently full of
examples of administration elites using language which is not
necessarily consistent with their actual beliefs, as a method
for political control and public support.6

Lasswell,

specifically referring to the use of language as propaganda
in foreign affairs, concurs.7
clear on this point.

Bennett, however is not as

He often suggests that cultural

processes and belief systems are consistent at all levels of
society; 8 implying that it is quite possible that decision
makers impart information to the public after that
information has already been filtered through their own
belief system.

The public then responds because the decision

makers belief system is consistent with their own.
This notion of belief system or perception is very
important as a variable in foreign policy analysis.

Both

Joseph deRivera9 and Gerald HopplelO have put a great
emphasis on this variable as affecting foreign policy
decisions.

Also Michael Sullivan argues that individual

images and perceptions should be considered "a crucial
independent agent accounting for individual behavior. 1111
Kegley and Wittkopf refer to something called the "law of
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anticipated reactions" 12 which hypothesizes that
because
there is every reason to believe that they embrace
the basic value assumptions of American society •••
decision maker screen out certain alternatives
because of their anticipation that the options would
be adversely received, an anticipation borr of the
American value tradition which they share. 3
This "law of anticipated reactions" essentially in the focus
of the analysis of this paper.

Did administration officials

accurately and consciously determine beforehand that there
would be certain factors limiting the ways in which the
policy could be presented for approval, thus opting to employ
a distorted presentation of events.

Or did they genuinely

them to the public.
Keyley and Wittkop£ consider that this latter point is
likely.
In fact, decision makers may not even be conscious
of the way in which political culture helps to ~ifine
in their minds the range of permissable policy.
Daniel J. Elazar concurs, noting that, political culture
often places limits or constraints on individuals in the
policy making process, and these limits are so effective
because, "those limited are unaware of the limitations placed
upon them. 1115
That individual decision making could be swayed by
their belief system or ideology in policy formulation is
consistent with the arguments of Hans Morganthau.

As noted

earlier in this essay, Morganthau maintained that ideology
plays a role in the making of foreign policy.
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While all politics is necessarily pursuit of power,
ideologies render involvement in that conte~t for power
psychologically gnd morally acceptable to.the actors and
their audience. 1
But Morganthau also notes,
the deeper the individual is involved in the
power struggle, the less likell he is to see the
power struggle for what it is. 7

.

Hence, decision makers, even those individuals who are
attempting to employ an extremely rational thought process,
are subject to their unconscious belief system.

The

information that is given to high leveled decision makers
must pass through a series of ideological filters before
policy is formulated.

These filters include the various

perceptions and images which the decision makers have of
this information.

These perceptions would invariably be

conditioned by the decision makers values and beliefs.

His

values and beliefs would, in turn, be conditioned by
societal values and beliefs which have been passed onto the
individual through such means as myth, folklore, the
educational system and family.

Beyond the effect that

belief system has on high level decision makers, is the
effect that belief system has on the lower level information
gatherers and disseminators.

Certainly, their own values

and beliefs would condition their own perceptions of
information and, thus, would effect their interpretations of
that information when relaying it to superiors.

One would

of course, expect that lower level decision makers would be
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subjected to the same societal values and cultural processes
that higher level decision makers are subjected to.
It is tremendously important, therefore, to consider
image or belief system as an intervening or a conditioning
variable when analyzing foreign policy formulation.

The aid

policies of the Truman Doctrine are one example where belief
system apparently played a large role in the formulation of
policy.

The ideological beliefs of the decision makers, if

not directly formulating the perceptions of the decision
makers, were certainly important as a conditioning variable
in the formulation of the decision.

This being the case, it

is difficult to conclude that manipulation occurred or that
propaganda was used.

As noted by Cohen, there is a fine

"aividing line between education and propaganda" and it is
difficult to determine at what point this line is crossed.
In the case of the Truman Doctrine, however, it appears that
the informational campaign and the rhetoric fell more on the
side of education than propaganda.

Hence, it is hard to

substantiate the manipulation thesis.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1:

(U.S.-AIPO-March 28, 1947)

Do you approve or disapprove of the bill asking for
250 million dollars to aid Greece? Asked of a
national cross-section of persons who had heard or
read about the issue of aid to Greece.
National total:

TABLE 2:

Yes
56%

No
32%

No Opinion
12%

(NORC-April 3, 1947)

1.

Do you approve of our government providing money
to Greece to help her recover from war?

2.

Do you approve or disapprove of our sending
military supplies to help the Greek government?

3.

Do you approve or disapprove of our sending
military supplies to help Turkey?

Approve
Disapprove
No Opinion

TABLE 3:

EconomicGreece
67%
27%
6%

MilitaryGreece Turkey
37%
30%
53%
54%
10 %
16 %

(NORC-July 15, 1947)

Do you approve or disapprove of our Government's
policy of sending aid to Greece? Asked in June 1947.
Approve
Disapprove
Qualified approval
Undecided

55%
19%
11%
15%
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TABLE 4:

(U.S.-AIPO-March, 1947)

Do you think that the present
government has the backing of
the majority--that is, more
than half--of the Greek people?
Do you think that the present
Turkish government has the
backing of the majority--that
ts, more than half--of the
Turkish people?

Yes

33%

No

25

No opinion

42

Yes
No
No opinion

14

34%
52

TABLE 5:
Indulgent

# Uses

Free/Freedom
14
Liberation
2
Peace-loving
1
Self-supporting
2
Self-respecting
1
Independent
3
Economically sound
1
National integrity
3
Preservation of Order
1
Representative government 1
Democracy
6

Deprivation

# Uses

Gravity of the
situation
.
National security
Invasion
Enemy occupation
Internal strife
Tragic conditions
Militant minorities
Misery
Exploitation
Political chaos
Terrorist activites
Communists
Border violations
Coercion
Aggressive movements
Impose
Totalitarian regimes
Intimidation
Oppression
Suppression
Endanger

1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
4
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
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TABLE 6:

CU.S.-AIPO-November 2, 1947)

Would you favor or oppose lending Western European
countries like England, France, Holland, and Norway

about 20 billion dollars over the next four years to
be spent for goods to be bought in this country?
Yes
No
Qualified
~o opinion

TABLE 7:

26%

48%
4%
22%

CU.S.-AIPO-November 2, 1947)

Would you favor or oppose sending Western European
countries like England, France, Holland and Norway
about 20 billion dollars worth of goods from this
country in order to improve conditions and keep those
countries from going Communistic?

,,

Yes

47%

No

33%

Qualified
No opinion

4%
16%

